Zbigniew Brzezinski
So much has been said and so much has been written on this subject that I think the most useful role I can play is simply it to posit a few points in a somewhat telegraphic style.
Let me makes these points very summarily. First of all, the campaign against terrorism is going to be waged on many fronts and I emphasize the word "many." It is not a local issue. It is certainly not concentrated just in Afghanistan.
There are many sources for terrorism. There is a wide-ranging network that is loosely organized and that it operates in several parts of the world, perhaps most significantly in the Middle East, but also Western Europe and very significantly in the United States.
Most of the planning, most of the organizational work for what transpired, in all probability, occurred in the United States. And anything that might follow here probably has been at work in the United States; that's my first point.
My second point is therefore we shouldn't over-emphasize or over-concentrate on Afghanistan. And most certainly not become involved in the continuing conflict within Afghanistan.
Any effective large-scale action against Afghanistan or involving action within Afghanistan would impose also enormous political burdens on Pakistan. And we have to be very careful not to enlarge the area of conflict and instability. Anything that may be done in regards to Afghanistan, in my view, should be limited.
Third, we should not overly personalize this issue. The standard of success or failure is not whether we capture or kill Osama bin Laden. The standard of success is whether we can eliminate the networks and in the longer run undercut the underlying causes, also the fanaticism and the hatred involved.
My fourth point is connected to the previous one, namely, that this is not a religious conflict. We're not struggling against Islamic terrorism. It would be similarly inappropriate to describe the IRA as reflecting Christian terrorism. We're dealing with a manifestation which is primarily political and arises out of political hatreds or grievances, although the fanaticism with which it is pursued may be infused with a religious motivation to the point of willing to give one's life in the course of terrorist acts. But I think we have to be very careful not to mix up in our own minds and in the public mind the notion of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as synonymous.
My fifth point is that some states harbor, perhaps even shelter, terrorist activities. Some promote them. Some ignore them, knowing though that they're ongoing. Our own response will have to differentiate accordingly. We have to be very careful not to act in a fashion that generalizes state-sponsored terrorism and thereby maximizes the enemies that the United States will have to confront.
My sixth point is that obviously we have to be ready for repetition of some of the acts that transpired. That's a serious security problem. It's also a serious psychological problem. We as a society have to be prepared psychologically for the possibility of repeated blows and we have to realize that this is part of the ongoing campaign that's going to last a long time.
My seventh point is that the long-term aspect of the response perhaps is the easiest to want to articulate and internationally to organize. That is to say, enhanced security, better intelligence, better knowledge of financial transactions, all pursued on an international basis and with international cooperation.
It also means addressing some of the political causes of the hatred and making certain that our own policy is in tune with the needs of the time. I think a broad coalition to that effect is not going to be that difficult to mount because there are quite a few states in the world that feel threatened, as we feel threatened.
The more complicated problem is going to be -- and this is my eighth point -- the medium-term response, namely, what do we do in regards to those governments that are unresponsive, or in fact, in some fashion engaged. And that will require preparation. It may call for covert action for which we'll have to be better organized than we're currently organized. It will mean perhaps collaboration with some states, although not with all of the states in terms of the long range coalition.
And the most difficult problem we face is the question of the immediate response. There has to be some sort of response. It cannot be delayed. It shouldn't be undertaken prematurely, but quite obviously there has to be some response to the fact that 5,000 or more Americans and friends were killed in cold blood and in a particularly brutal fashion in some cases.
And hence, we have to deal with the question of how we respond, where we respond, against whom we respond and with whom we respond. That's a sensitive issue and I don't think I can make any useful contribution by being very specific on this subject, I think for quite obvious reasons, especially since there are ongoing discussions on this subject, exactly. But I would say as a general proposition, that if we can have some participants in a common response from other countries, that would be good, because it would emphasize the fact that the United States has allies who can act with us in special circumstances and perhaps in a more selective and more immediate response. And some countries have the capability to participate in such an undertaking.
I would also add that it's important that this be done in a manner that conveys credibility and seriousness. Not some stand-off attacks with cruise missiles against uncertain targets. But an operation which involves American combat units, particularly special forces, airborne, and some participation from foreign countries. And there are a number of targets that could be considered suitable for such an undertaking which are relevant to what transpired and not necessarily are all of them in Afghanistan. And that is something which has to be addressed on a systematic basis.
The key point is that our response has to be both immediate, longer term, very long term with different degrees of coalitions. It has to be very determined. It has to be painful for those at whom it is directed, but it has to be sustained. I think the President is going to emphasize the need for long-term commitment and I think after the first shock will resolve, the American people are going to demonstrate that they have staying power, that they know how to live in the face of dangers, that they are prepared to take risks and they're quite capable of doing what is needed.
Let me makes these points very summarily. First of all, the campaign against terrorism is going to be waged on many fronts and I emphasize the word "many." It is not a local issue. It is certainly not concentrated just in Afghanistan.
There are many sources for terrorism. There is a wide-ranging network that is loosely organized and that it operates in several parts of the world, perhaps most significantly in the Middle East, but also Western Europe and very significantly in the United States.
Most of the planning, most of the organizational work for what transpired, in all probability, occurred in the United States. And anything that might follow here probably has been at work in the United States; that's my first point.
My second point is therefore we shouldn't over-emphasize or over-concentrate on Afghanistan. And most certainly not become involved in the continuing conflict within Afghanistan.
Any effective large-scale action against Afghanistan or involving action within Afghanistan would impose also enormous political burdens on Pakistan. And we have to be very careful not to enlarge the area of conflict and instability. Anything that may be done in regards to Afghanistan, in my view, should be limited.
Third, we should not overly personalize this issue. The standard of success or failure is not whether we capture or kill Osama bin Laden. The standard of success is whether we can eliminate the networks and in the longer run undercut the underlying causes, also the fanaticism and the hatred involved.
My fourth point is connected to the previous one, namely, that this is not a religious conflict. We're not struggling against Islamic terrorism. It would be similarly inappropriate to describe the IRA as reflecting Christian terrorism. We're dealing with a manifestation which is primarily political and arises out of political hatreds or grievances, although the fanaticism with which it is pursued may be infused with a religious motivation to the point of willing to give one's life in the course of terrorist acts. But I think we have to be very careful not to mix up in our own minds and in the public mind the notion of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as synonymous.
My fifth point is that some states harbor, perhaps even shelter, terrorist activities. Some promote them. Some ignore them, knowing though that they're ongoing. Our own response will have to differentiate accordingly. We have to be very careful not to act in a fashion that generalizes state-sponsored terrorism and thereby maximizes the enemies that the United States will have to confront.
My sixth point is that obviously we have to be ready for repetition of some of the acts that transpired. That's a serious security problem. It's also a serious psychological problem. We as a society have to be prepared psychologically for the possibility of repeated blows and we have to realize that this is part of the ongoing campaign that's going to last a long time.
My seventh point is that the long-term aspect of the response perhaps is the easiest to want to articulate and internationally to organize. That is to say, enhanced security, better intelligence, better knowledge of financial transactions, all pursued on an international basis and with international cooperation.
It also means addressing some of the political causes of the hatred and making certain that our own policy is in tune with the needs of the time. I think a broad coalition to that effect is not going to be that difficult to mount because there are quite a few states in the world that feel threatened, as we feel threatened.
The more complicated problem is going to be -- and this is my eighth point -- the medium-term response, namely, what do we do in regards to those governments that are unresponsive, or in fact, in some fashion engaged. And that will require preparation. It may call for covert action for which we'll have to be better organized than we're currently organized. It will mean perhaps collaboration with some states, although not with all of the states in terms of the long range coalition.
And the most difficult problem we face is the question of the immediate response. There has to be some sort of response. It cannot be delayed. It shouldn't be undertaken prematurely, but quite obviously there has to be some response to the fact that 5,000 or more Americans and friends were killed in cold blood and in a particularly brutal fashion in some cases.
And hence, we have to deal with the question of how we respond, where we respond, against whom we respond and with whom we respond. That's a sensitive issue and I don't think I can make any useful contribution by being very specific on this subject, I think for quite obvious reasons, especially since there are ongoing discussions on this subject, exactly. But I would say as a general proposition, that if we can have some participants in a common response from other countries, that would be good, because it would emphasize the fact that the United States has allies who can act with us in special circumstances and perhaps in a more selective and more immediate response. And some countries have the capability to participate in such an undertaking.
I would also add that it's important that this be done in a manner that conveys credibility and seriousness. Not some stand-off attacks with cruise missiles against uncertain targets. But an operation which involves American combat units, particularly special forces, airborne, and some participation from foreign countries. And there are a number of targets that could be considered suitable for such an undertaking which are relevant to what transpired and not necessarily are all of them in Afghanistan. And that is something which has to be addressed on a systematic basis.
The key point is that our response has to be both immediate, longer term, very long term with different degrees of coalitions. It has to be very determined. It has to be painful for those at whom it is directed, but it has to be sustained. I think the President is going to emphasize the need for long-term commitment and I think after the first shock will resolve, the American people are going to demonstrate that they have staying power, that they know how to live in the face of dangers, that they are prepared to take risks and they're quite capable of doing what is needed.
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